Defeasible logics provide several linguistic features to support the expression of defeasible knowledge. There is also a wide variety of such logics, expressing different intuitions about defeasible reasoning. However, the logics can only combine in trivial ways. This limits their usefulness in contexts where different intuitions are at play in different aspects of a problem. In particular, in some legal settings, different actors have different burdens of proof, which might be expressed as reasoning in different defeasible logics.
Introduction
In some application domains, for example legal reasoning, knowing that something holds (or it is presumed to hold) is not enough to draw further conclusions from it. One has to determine to what degree one can assert that it holds. In other words statements in rules (here we use the term 'rule' to indicate a mechanism/principle to assert conclusions from already established assertions) have an associated proof standard. Accordingly, a party wanting to assert a particular assertion has the burden to prove that assertion with the appropriate standard (or a stronger one).
Consider the following rule:
IllegalBehaviour , ¬Justification ⇒ Liability Suppose there is factual evidence about the illegal behaviour. The information in the rule is not enough, since it does not prescribe the burden needed to assess whether the behaviour was justified or not. According to (Prakken and Sartor 2007; Governatori and Sartor 2010) , in a civil case the lack of justification is subject to the so-called burden of production, i.e., there is a credible argument for it, while in a criminal case the burden of persuasion applies (i.e., more sceptical reasoning must be used).
Let us consider a concrete scenario. Party A caused some injuries to B. Party A was much stronger than Party B, and thus the action causing injury is not justified. On the other hand, Party A claims that they acted in self defence since they were under threat from Party B. The scenario can now be modelled by the rules:
Here, in case we are not able to assess whether the threat was real, we have a credible argument for ¬Justification (because Party A is stronger), but we do not have a sceptical argument for it (because it might be that the threat was real, and then the outcome from the two conflicting rules is undetermined). Thus, we can establish liability in a civil case, but Party A is not criminally liable. Accordingly, we can reformulate the initial rule in the following two principles:
Tort , BurdenProduction(¬Justification) ⇒ CivilCaseLiability Crime, BurdenPersuasion(¬Justification) ⇒ CriminalCaseLiability where BurdenProduction and BurdenPersuasion are annotations describing the mode in which we have to prove the lack of justification for the illegal behaviour.
Legal reasoning has developed so-called proof standards (e.g., scintilla of evidence, substantial evidence, preponderance of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) according to which assertions have to be justified. (Gordon and Walton 2009) proposed to encode proof standards using rulebased argumentation with salience, and (Governatori 2011) shows how to represent the proof standards of (Gordon and Walton 2009) where, essentially, each proof standard corresponds to a different degree of provability in some defeasible logic variant. In particular, (Governatori 2011) argues that the proof standard of beyond reasonable doubt corresponds to provability in the ambiguity propagating variant of defeasible logic. However, as the following example illustrates there are examples where more than one such proof standards must be used. This means that incompatible variants of defeasible logic have to work side-by-side.
Suppose that a piece of evidence A suggests that the defendant in a legal case is not responsible while a second piece of evidence B indicates that he/she is responsible; moreover, the sources are equally reliable. According to the underlying legal system a defendant is presumed innocent (i.e., not guilty) unless responsibility has been proved (beyond reasonable doubt).
The above scenario is encoded by the following rules:
⇒ ¬Guilty where r 3 is stronger than r 4 . Given both EvidenceA and EvidenceB , the literal Responsible is ambiguous. There are applicable rules (r 1 and r 2 ) for and against the literal, with no way to adjudicate between them. As a consequence r 3 is not applicable, and so there is no applicable rule arguing against the presumption of innocence (rule r 4 ). In an ambiguity blocking setting we obtain a ¬Guilty verdict; the ambiguity about responsibility is blocked from applying to Guilty.
In contrast, in an ambiguity propagating setting, the ambiguity of Responsible propagates to Guilty, and thus the literals Guilty and ¬Guilty are ambiguous too; hence an undisputed conclusion cannot be drawn. When we look at the example above, is it appropriate to say that we have reached a not guilty verdict without any reasonable doubt? The evidence supporting that the defendant was responsible has not been refuted. This example supports the contention of (Governatori 2011 ) that ambiguity propagating inference is a more appropriate representation of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Let us extend the scenario. Suppose that the legal system allows for compensation for wrongly accused people. A person (defendant) has been wrongly accused if the defendant is found innocent, where innocent is defined as ¬Guilty. In addition, by default, people are not entitled to compensation. The additional elements of this scenario are modelled by the rules:
⇒ ¬Compensation where r 5 is stronger than r 6 . In the full scenario, the defendant is not found innocent, and so is not entitled to compensation. If we take a purely ambiguity blocking stance then, since we are not able to determine whether there was responsibility, the defendant is not guilty, and then the defendant is entitled to compensation. On the other hand, in a purely ambiguity propagating setting, Guilty and ¬Guilty are ambiguous, and this makes Compensation and ¬Compensation ambiguous; we are in a position where we cannot decide whether the defendant is entitled or not to compensation. Thus, both choices are unsatisfactory: either the defendant receives compensation despite not being found innocent or no decision is made about compensation.
What we want is a regime where we can reason about guilt in an ambiguity propagating way, but then reason about compensation in an ambiguity blocking way. This can be achieve by replacing rule r 5 with r ′ 5 : BeyondReasonableDoubt (¬Guitly) ⇒ Compensation where, similarly to what we have done in the previous example, BeyondReasonableDoubt is an annotation to the literal ¬Guilty that holds in case the literal is provable under ambiguity propagation, and the proof standard for Compensation can be chosen to be ambiguity blocking.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formalism -annotated defeasible logic -in which such distinctions can be expressed, define its semantics, and investigate properties of the formalism.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide brief background on defeasible logics. We then introduce annotated defeasible logic, and define its behaviour with a meta-program. In the following section we establish some properties of annotated defeasible logic, including its relationship to existing defeasible logics and the relative inference strength of the additional inference rules we introduce. Finally, we show that annotated defeasible logic has the flexibility to deal with different notions of failure, corresponding to different semantics of negation-as-failure in logic programs. Due to space limitations, parts of the paper -including proof sketches -are presented in the supplementary material accompanying the paper at the TPLP archive.
Defeasible Logics
In this section we can only present an outline of defeasible logics. Further details can be obtained from (Billington et al. 2010 ) and the references therein. We address propositional defeasible logics, but many results should extend to a first-order language.
A defeasible theory is built from a language Σ of literals (which we assume is closed under negation) and a language Λ of labels. A defeasible theory D = (F, R, >) consists of a set of facts F , a finite set of rules R, each rule with a distinct label from Λ, and an acyclic relation > on Λ called the superiority relation. This syntax is uniform for all the logics considered here. Facts are individual literals expressing indisputable truths. Rules relate a set of literals (the body), via an arrow, to a literal (the head), and are one of three types: a strict rule, with arrow →; a defeasible rule, with arrow ⇒; or a defeater, with arrow ❀. Strict rules represent inferences that are unequivocally sound if based on definite knowledge; defeasible rules represent inferences that are generally sound. Inferences suggested by a defeasible rule may fail, due to the presence in the theory of other rules. Defeaters do not support inferences, but may impede inferences suggested by other rules. The superiority relation provides a local priority on rules with conflicting heads. Strict or defeasible rules whose bodies are established defeasibly represent claims for the head of the rule to be concluded. When both a literal and its negation are claimed, the superiority relation contributes to the adjudication of these conflicting claims by an inference rule, leading (possibly) to a conclusion.
Defeasible logics derive conclusions that are outside the syntax of the theories. Conclusions may have the form +dq, which denotes that under the inference rule d the literal q can be concluded, or −dq, which denotes that the logic can establish that under the inference rule d the literal q cannot be concluded. The syntactic element d is called a proof tag. In general, neither conclusion may be derivable: q cannot be concluded under d, but the logic is unable to establish that. Tags +∆ and −∆ represent monotonic provability (and unprovability) where inference is based on facts, strict rules, and modus ponens. We assume these tags and their inference rules are present in every defeasible logic. What distinguishes a logic is the inference rules for defeasible reasoning. The four logics discussed in (Billington et al. 2010) correspond to four different pairs of inference rules, tagged ∂, δ, ∂ * , and δ * ; they produce conclusions of the form (respectively) +∂q, −∂q, +δq, −δq, etc., where q is a literal. These logics all abide by the Principle of Strong Negation , which asserts that the condition for applying a −d inference rule should be the strong negation of the condition for applying +d. The inference rules δ and δ * require auxiliary tags and inference rules, denoted by σ δ and σ δ * , respectively 1 , expressing that there is at least (weak) support for the conclusion. These inference rules are available in the supplementary material. For each of the four principal defeasible tags d, the corresponding logic is denoted by
The four principal tags and corresponding inference rules represent different intuitions about defeasible reasoning, that is, define different forms of defeasibility: in ∂ and ∂ * ambiguity is blocked, while in δ and δ * ambiguity is propagated; in ∂ and δ rules for a literal act as a team to overcome competing rules, while in ∂ * and δ * an individual rule must overcome all competing rules. The scenario in the introduction with rules r 1 − r 4 exemplifies the treatments of ambiguity. For an example of team defeat, consider rules s 1 and s 2 for q and rules s 3 and s 4 for ¬q, with s 1 > s 3 and s 2 > s 4 ; then no individual rule for q can overcome the rules for ¬q, but s 1 and s 2 -as a team -can, because every rule for ¬q is overridden by some rule in the team. A more detailed discussion of ambiguity and team defeat in the DL framework is given in (Billington et al. 2010; Maher 2012) .
In (Maher and Governatori 1999; , the inference rules in DL(d) were reformulated as a meta-program M d : a logic program that takes a representation of a defeasible theory D as input and specifies what conclusions can be drawn from the theory according to the d inference rules. (The combined meta-program and theory is denoted by M d (D).) We will take this meta-programming formulation as our starting point, rather than the inference rules as presented in (Billington et al. 2010 ), for example. This meta-program formulation is given in the supplementary material. We assume, initially, that the logic programming semantics in use is Kunen's semantics (Kunen 1987) , which expresses the 3-valued logical consequences of the Clark completion of a logic program. Equivalently, Kunen's semantics is the set of all consequences of Φ ↑ n for any finite n, where Φ is Fitting's semantic function for logic programs (Fitting 1985) . (Fitting' s semantics, which is the least fixedpoint of Φ, expresses the logical consequences of 3-valued Herbrand models of the Clark completion of a logic program.) Although defeasible logics are usually founded on proofs, there are alternative semantics for these logics: a model-theoretic semantics was defined in (Maher 2002 ), a denotational semantics for DL(∂) was presented in (Maher 2000) , and an argumentation semantics for DL(∂) was given in (Governatori et al. 2004 ). Each of these approaches provides an alternative characterization of the conclusions derivable by proofs in the logic. However, in this paper we only use the meta-programming formulation of the proof systems.
In the following, annotated defeasible logic will be defined as an integration of the four defeasible logics discussed above. However, it should be clear that the same approach can be applied to any set of defeasible logics employing the same logic programming semantics.
Annotated Defeasible Logic
Annotated defeasible logic is the formalism we propose, motivated by the discussion in the introduction. We begin by addressing its syntax, which is an extension of the syntax of defeasible logics.
A tag is any one of the proof tags, or the additional tag free. An annotated literal has the form t q, where t is a tag and q is a literal. An annotated defeasible rule has the form
where r is a label, q is a literal and each L i is either an annotated literal or a fail-expression, where a fail-expression has the form fail L, where L is an annotated literal. An annotated defeater is defined similarly; strict rules are not annotated.
Roughly, the meaning of a rule
is that if q i can be proved using inference rule t i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and proof of q i can be demonstrated to fail using inference rule t i , for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then we have a prima facie reason to infer q. As with all defeasible logics, such an inference can be overridden by another rule. A proof tag only indicates which inference rule should be applied to resolve conflict concerning that literal. Thus, an annotated literal t q is asking, roughly, for +t q to be proved. A fail-expression fail t q is asking, roughly, for −t q to be proved. The free tag has a different meaning than the proof tags. A free literal freeq i must be proved by the same inference rule that is intended to prove q. This provides a mechanism by which defeasible rules can be agnostic as to inference rule, which can be determined later, just as defeasible rules in current defeasible logics are.
An annotated defeasible theory is a defeasible theory where the defeasible rules are annotated and fail-expressions are allowed. Alternatively, we can think of an annotated defeasible theory as consisting of an unannotated defeasible theory (the underlying theory) D that allows fail-expressions, and an annotation function α that maps each body literal occurrence to its annotation. In this case we denote the annotated defeasible theory by α(D). We can consider α a total function, or consider it a partial function mapping literal occurrences to proof tags. The unmapped literals are free.
We now turn to expressing the meaning of annotated defeasible theories using the metaprogramming approach. The semantics of a theory is parameterized by a logic programming semantics, which is applied to a meta-program.
Given an annotated defeasible theory D = (F, R, >), the theory is represented by facts as follows:
for each pair of rules such that r i > r j where the L i are annotated literals or fail-expressions. The meta-program to which these facts are input is denoted by M, while the combination of M and the representation of D is denoted by M(D). In what follows, we permit ourselves some syntactic flexibility in presenting the meta-program. (For example, we enumerate a list instead of explicitly iterating over it, and express the complementation operation ∼as a function 2 .
Furthermore, tags and fail are unary functors.) However, there is no technical difficulty in using conventional logic programming syntax to represent this program. Before we get to the predicates that define the meaning of theories, we define some auxiliary predicates.
As discussed in the introduction to defeasible logics, the different proof tags represent different forms of defeasibility. In particular, some forms block ambiguity, while others propagate ambiguity; some use team defeat, while others require an individual rule to overcome all conflicting rules. The following facts are used to specify, for each proof tag: that it is a proof tag, whether it expresses team defeat or individual defeat, and whether the inference rule blocks or propagates ambiguity. Strictly speaking, we should distinguish the proof tags appearing syntactically in M from the tags appearing in conclusions (which are not part of the syntax of defeasible logics, but part of its meta-theory). However, because there is a clear correspondence between the two, we find it clearer to use the same symbol for both.
ambiguity blocking(∂ * ).
ambiguity blocking(∂).
ambiguity propagating(δ * ).
ambiguity propagating(δ).
proof tag(∂ * ).
proof tag(∂).
proof tag(δ * ).
proof tag(δ).
2 The complement of p is ¬p and the complement of ¬p is p. ∼ is unrelated to fail, since it is the complement of classical negation.
The following clauses define the class of all rules and the class of supportive rules. Defeaters are not supportive rules because they can only be used to prevent other conclusions; they cannot support any conclusion.
supportive rule(Label, Head, Body):-strict(Label, Head, Body).
supportive rule(Label, Head, Body):-defeasible(Label, Head, Body).
rule(Label, Head, Body):-supportive rule(Label, Head, Body).
rule(Label, Head, Body):-defeater(Label, Head, Body).
The next clauses express monotonic provability.
In the predicate expressing defeasible inference, defeasibly, one argument is written as a subscript Z in the following clauses. That argument takes as its value one of the four proof tags and represents the inference rule that should be applied to resolve conflict for the literal in the other argument, unless the literal has a proof annotation. All clauses for predicates with a subscript Z implicitly contain proof tag(Z) in their body. In clause c3 we see that freeannotated literals are to be proved according to Z.
In clause c4, fail-expressions are defined: failure is implemented by negation. This is valid because the logics involved satisfy the Principle of Strong Negation. For such logics, the conditions for −d inference rules are a negation of the conditions for +d inference rules. In both defeasible logics and logic programming, failure-to-prove is a primitive notion, available in defeasible logics through negative tags and in logic programming through negation. Hence, it is not surprising that failure is implemented by negation in the meta-program.
The remaining two clauses are reflective of the basic structure of defeasible reasoning. Clause c5 expresses that any literally that is definitely true (proved monotonically from facts and strict rules) is also defeasibly true. Clause c6 handles an annotated literal by using the tag Y as the subscript argument in subsidiary computations. This clause says that a literal X, annotated by Y , is proved if the negation of X is not proved monotonically and there is a supportive rule R that is not overruled, each of whose body literals are proved defeasibly according to Y .
The basic structure of overruling a rule is similar for all defeasible logics: the body of the overruling rule must be proved and the rule not "defeated". However, it varies depending on whether the logic blocks or propagates ambiguity. In an ambiguity blocking logic, the body of the overruling rule must be established defeasibly whereas, in an ambiguity propagating logic, the body of the overruling rule need only be supported.
The notion of defeat varies, depending on whether a logic involves team defeat or individual defeat. In individual defeat, the overruling rule S is defeated if the rule R it tries to overrule is superior to S. In team defeat, S is defeated if there is a rule T (possibly the same as R) that is superior to S and whose body can be proved.
The structure of this meta-program makes one point clear that was less readily apparent in or (Billington et al. 2010 ): treatment of ambiguity concerns how the body of an overruling rule is proved, while the choice of team/individual defeat concerns how an overruling rule can be defeated.
For the ambiguity propagating logics we must define the notion of "supported". The intuition is that a literal is supported if there is a chain of supportive rules that form a proof tree for the literal, and each supportive rule is not beaten (i.e. overruled) by a rule that is proved defeasbily. In ordinary defeasible logics support is only needed for the ambiguity propagating logics but, for annotated defeasible theories, we also need to have support for ambiguity blocking logics. This is because we might wish to use, as part of the support, a rule that contains an annotated literal such as ∂q. Hence the supported predicate is defined uniformly, with a parameter Z specifying the form of defeasibility underlying the support. Thus we are introducing new forms of support: σ ∂ and σ ∂ * .
As with defeasibly, the clauses for supported address free literals, fail-expressions, literals that are proved definitely, and proof-annotated literals. Note how the parameter Z to supported is used by beaten to select the form of defeasibility for which the body of an overruling rule must be proved.
Let us now examine how to put annotated defeasible logic to work by revisiting the compensation example presented in the introduction. As we have already discussed, Guilty must be proven with the "beyond reasonable doubt" proof standard to derive that the defendant is entitled to receive a compensation.
As we have alluded to in the introduction, (Gordon and Walton 2009) proposed to model proof standards such as scintilla of evidence, preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing case, beyond reasonable doubts and dialectical validity using rule based argumentation. For example, they define that the proof standard of preponderance of evident for a literal p is satisfied if and only if the maximum weight of applicable arguments for p exceeds some threshold α, and the difference between the maximum weight of the applicable arguments for p and the maximum weight of the applicable arguments against p exceeds some threshold β. (Governatori 2011) shows how the weights and thresholds can be modelled by a preference relation (superiority) over arguments (rules) and it establishes the following relationships between the proof standards and proof tags: Thus, the proof standard of beyond reasonable doubt corresponds to defeasible provability using ambiguity propagation. Accordingly, we can replace BeyondReasonableDoubt in rule r ′ 5 with +δ. All the other literals appearing in the body of the rules do not require special proof standards, and thus we can annotate them with free. Consequently, the formalization of this scenario in annotated defeasible logic is:
free
⇒ ¬Compensation
It is easy to verify that we now derive +∂¬Compensation, that the defendant is not entitled to compensation, as the scenario requires.
Properties of Annotated Defeasible Theories
We now investigate properties of annotated defeasible logic, exploiting its logic programming underpinnings.
The first theorem relates the meta-program for annotated defeasible logic to the meta-programs for existing defeasible logics DL(d). Those logics do not contain fail-expressions. We write |= K for logical consequence under Kunen's semantics (Kunen 1987) 
) is the meta-programming representation for D annotated by α.
Theorem 1
Let D = (F, R, >) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation function for that theory. Let d ∈ {δ * , δ, ∂ * , ∂}. Suppose α(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression in R. Then, for every literal q
The proof is based on separately unfolding M(α(D)) and M d (D) until they have essentially the same form.
As an immediate corollary to this theorem, we see that annotated defeasible theories are a conservative extension of defeasible theories. Let the free annotation function be the annotation Fig. 1 . Ordering of inference rules by relative inference strength.
function that maps every body literal occurrence in D to free. For any defeasible theory D, the unannotated theory behaves exactly the same as the theory annotated by the free annotation function.
Corollary 2
Suppose that α F is the free annotation function for D. Let d ∈ {δ * , δ, ∂ * , ∂}. Then, for every literal q,
For any tag d and an annotated defeasible theory
We can now extend the inclusion theorem of (Billington et al. 2010 ) to the new tags and annotated defeasible logic. This theorem shows the relative inference strength of the different forms of defeasibility.
Theorem 3 (Inclusion Theorem)
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory.
The proof is by induction on the iteration stages of Fitting's Φ M(D) function. The inclusions in this theorem are presented graphically in Figure 1 . The relation t 1 ⊂ t 2 expresses that, for all defeasible theories D, +t 1 (D) ⊆ +t 2 (D) and −t 1 (D) ⊇ −t 2 (D), and, for some defeasible theory D, +t 1 (D) ⊂ +t 2 (D). The containments come from the theorem, while their strictness is demonstrated by simple examples. Examples also show that there are no containments that can be added to the figure. This ordering on tags can be extended to annotation functions. Let α 1 and α 2 be annotation functions for a defeasible theory D. We define α 1 ⊑ α 2 iff for every body occurrence o of every literal in D, α 1 (o) ⊂ α 2 (o). If such an ordering had implications for the conclusions of the annotated theories, it would provide a useful basis from which to reason about annotated defeasible theories. Unfortunately, the most obvious possibility -a kind of monotonicity -does not hold, as the following example shows.
Example 4
Let D consist of the rules
⇒ ¬p r 6 : ⇒ ¬s r 3 : ⇒ q r 4 : ¬p ⇒ ¬q with r 5 > r 6 .
Let α 1 map q in r 5 to δ, and α 2 map q in r 5 to ∂ (with all other occurrences mapped to free). Then α 1 ⊑ α 2 . Rules r 1 -r 4 are a standard example distinguishing ambiguity blocking and propagating behaviours. +∂q and −δq can be concluded. Consequently, in α 1 (D) we conclude +∂¬s and −∂s while in α 2 (D) we conclude −∂¬s and +∂s.
Thus we see that a strengthening of the annotation function (in the ⊑ ordering) does not necessarily lead to a strengthening of the conclusions of the annotated defeasible theory.
For the defeasible logics we address, the consequences of a defeasible theory can be computed in linear time, with respect to the size of the theory (Maher 2001; Billington et al. 2010 ), but these logics only support one form of defeasibility. Annotated defeasible logic allows the interaction between the different inference rules but, nevertheless, we expect its consequences can also be computed in linear time, although with a larger constant factor. (Certainly, it is straightforward to show we can compute consequences in quadratic time. See the supplementary material.) Let
where D is an annotated defeasible theory, T = {∂, ∂ * , δ, δ * } refers to the four main forms of defeasibility, and q ranges over annotated literals.
Conjecture 5
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory, and |D| be the number of symbols in D. Then the set of consequences C(D) can be computed in time O(|D|).
Different Forms of Failure
One advantage of the framework of (Maher and Governatori 1999; is that different notions of failure can be obtained by different semantics for logic programs. In this section we demonstrate that annotated defeasible logic is a conservative extension of those logics for many such semantics.
Many of the logic programming semantics we will focus on can be seen to be derived from the 3-valued stable models (Przymusinski 1990 ) (also known as partial stable models, but distinct from partial stable models in (Saccà and Zaniolo 1990) ). In addition to the semantics based on all partial stable models, there is the well-founded model (Gelder et al. 1991) , which is the least partial stable model under the information ordering (Przymusinski 1990 ) (called F -least in (Przymusinski 1990) ); the (2-valued) stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) ; the regular models (You and Yuan 1994) , which are the maximal partial stable models under set inclusion on the positive literals; and the L-stable models (Eiter et al. 1997) , which are the maximal partial stable models under set inclusion on positive and negative literals or, equivalently, the minimal partial stable models under set inclusion on the undefined literals. The interest in these semantics derives from the use of their counterparts in abstract argumentation (Caminada et al. 2015) .
Let S denote the collection of semantics mentioned above, with the exception of the stable semantics. That is, S = {partial stable, well -founded , regular , L-stable, Kunen, Fitting}. These semantics (and the stable semantics) are preserved by unfolding (see (Aravindan and Dung 1995; Maher 2017) ). Consequently, Theorem 1 extends to the semantics in S:
Theorem 6
Let D = (F, R, >) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation for that theory. Let d ∈ {δ * , δ, ∂ * , ∂}. Suppose α(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression in R. Let S ∈ S. Then
More generally, the S-models of M(α(D)) restricted to defeasibly d are identical (up to predicate renaming) to the S-models of M d (D) restricted to defeasibly.
In particular, annotated defeasible logic under the well-founded semantics extends the wellfounded defeasible logics (Maher and Governatori 1999; Maher et al. 2011 
and similar clauses for ∂ * (as well as other clauses). It is clear that if defeasibly ∂ (∂ q) holds then the structure of these two clauses prevents the existence of a stable model, while if ¬defeasibly ∂ (∂ q) then defeasibly ∂ (∂ p) holds in every stable model, assuming there is nothing else preventing the formation of stable models. The same applies for ∂ * . Now, defeasibly ∂ (∂ q) holds, but defeasibly ∂ * (∂ * q) does not. It follows, from the proof of Theorem 1, that M ∂ * (D) has stable models but M(D) does not.
Thus Theorem 6 holds for stable models only when all forms of defeasibility and supportedness have stable models.
Related Work
Among the features of annotated defeasible theories are: (1) the language supports multiple forms of defeasibility within a single defeasible theory, indeed within a single rule; (2) the language provides explicit fail-expressions; (3) the framework has the ability to incorporate different notions of failure-to-prove, corresponding to different semantics of negation-as-failure. No other formalism for defeasible reasoning has all these features.
Courteous logic programs (Grosof 1997 ) (and later developments (Wan et al. 2009; Wan et al. 2015 )) permit negation-as-failure expressions in defeasible rules, which are essentially the same as failexpressions. ) discussed a specific transformation for eliminating these expressions from courteous logic programs; that transformation is not sound for ambiguity propagating logics. Our meta-programming approach to fail-expressions was discussed in (Maher and Governatori 1999) , for a language with a single form of defeasibility, and our Theorem 1 extends to languages with such fail-expressions.
Within proof-theoretic treatments of defeasible logics (see, for example (Maier and Nute 2010) and (Billington et al. 2010 )) the logics can incorporate multiple forms of defeasibility, but they don't interact. For example, the proof of +∂q cannot depend on the proof of +δp: it can only depend on proofs of ∂ conclusions. Within the meta-programming framework of (Maher and Governatori 1999; a logic has only a single form of defeasibility, although this can be easily remedied by the use of multiple variants of the defeasibly predicate. Still, the multiple forms don't interact. Structured argumentation approaches, such as ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010) , use unannotated rules without an inference rule (in the sense above) and hence define a single form of defeasibility. A meta-program component of the languages LPDA and ASPDA (Wan et al. 2009; Wan et al. 2015) , called an argumentation theory, is capable of specifying a different inference rule for each literal, but not for each occurrence of each literal. Thus, although they provide more interaction than the defeasible logics, they do not provide the ability to apply different inference rules to the same atom.
It should be noted that the logics of (Billington et al. 2010 ) are able to simulate each other (Maher 2012; Maher 2013) (and ASPIC+ appears expressive enough to simulate these logics), but such an approach to incorporating multiple forms of defeasibility leads to an unnatural representation and has computational penalties. It also fails to represent free-expressions, since the top level form of defeasibility must be fixed before simulations can be coded.
Annotated logic programs (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992) are an extension of logic programs to multi-valued logics, where the truth values are assumed to form an upper semi-lattice. Atoms in the body are annotated by truth values and the head is annotated by a function of those truth values. Thus there are some similarities to annotated defeasible logic, in the use of annotations, including a similarity of variable annotations and free-expressions. However, annotated defeasible logic uses proof tags -not truth values -as annotations, and does not assume any ordering on the annotations. Further, the semantics of annotated logic programs is essentially a disjunction of the conclusions of rules, so this formalism is unable to represent the overriding of a rule by a competing rule.
Most defeasible logics support a single semantics of failure: Kunen's (Billington et al. 2010 ), well-founded (Maher and Governatori 1999; Maier and Nute 2010; Maher et al. 2011; Grosof 1997; Wan et al. 2009 ), stable (Verheij 2003; Maier 2013; Wan et al. 2015) . Apart from the framework of , the only defeasible formalisms supporting multiple semantics are structured argumentation languages like ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010) . But such languages do not support multiple forms of defeasibility.
The annotation mechanism we presented is closely related to the introduction of modal literals in modal defeasible logic (Governatori et al. 2016) , where each rule is labelled with the mode (✷) its conclusion can be proved and the literals ✷q and ✸q correspond to +∂ ✷ q and −∂ ✷ ¬q. While each modality has its own inference rule, each supports a single form of defeasibility. This raised the question whether different forms of defeasibility could be combined: the present paper offers a positive answer.
Conclusion
We have argued that we need a formalism that supports different kinds of defeasible reasoning, and introduced annotated defeasible logic to fulfil that requirement. The semantics of the annotated logic is defined through a logic program, and we are able to exploit that medium to prove properties of the logic.
Inference Rules
Defeasible logics are usually defined via their proof mechanism. Here we present the inference rules for the four defeasible logics we integrate within annotated defeasible logic. Each inference rule is labelled by the kind of conclusions it infers. The presentation is adapted from (Billington et al. 2010) . A defeasible logic is determined by the inference rules it allows. For example, DL(∂) allows +∂ and −∂, while DL(δ) allows +δ, −δ, +σ δ , and −σ δ .
A proof P is a sequence of conclusions. The conclusion at position i in the sequence is denoted by P (i), and a prefix of the proof of length i is denoted by P [1..i]. The inference rules establish when a conclusion can be drawn at position i + 1, given the conclusions already proved (P [1.
.i]).
Where q is a literal, R sd [q] denotes the set of strict or defeasible rules with head q, while R[q] denotes the set of all rules (including defeaters) with head q. For a rule r, A(r) denotes the antecedent (or body) of r.
+∂) Infer
2) The following three conditions all hold. 
.i], and .2) s > r.
Original Meta-programs
The original metaprograms (Maher and Governatori 1999; for the four main forms of defeasibility are outlined below. They consist of clauses c1 and c2, defining definitely, clauses defining rule and supportive rule (see body of the paper), and a selection of the following clauses for each form of defeasibility. 
Proof
(Sketch) The proof of this theorem is similar for each tag d. For brevity, we only provide the details for δ. The proof is based on unfolding M(α(D)) until it has essentially the same form as an unfolding of M d (D). The form of unfolding we use uses clauses from the current program, and may be applied as long as no clause is used to unfold an atom in its own body. Such unfolding preserves the Kunen semantics (i.e. 3-valued models of the Clark-completion) of a logic program by essentially the same argument that it preserves the 2-valued models (Maher 1988) . Clauses c1, c2, and c5 are the same in both M and M d , so we will essentially ignore them. In both M(α(D)) and M δ (D) we unfold all occurrences of the predicates used to represent the annotated defeasible theory, and rule and supportive rule. Then, in M(α(D)), we unfold all occurrences of the predicates specifying the type of each tag: ambiguity propagating, ambiguity blocking, proof tag, team, and indiv. At this point clauses derived from c6-c8 are ground, while clauses derived from c10 only have a single, unused variable X in their heads. Similarly, clauses derived from c14 and c15 are ground.
Then unfold all defeasibly Z (free L) atoms. This will not result in a clause unfolding itself: in c3 because Z is not free, and in c6 because Y is not free. Similarly, we unfold all supported Z (free L) atoms. As a result, free only occurs in the head of clauses derived from c3 and c11.
Finally, unfold all M(α(D)) and defeated atoms in M δ (D). At this stage, clauses derived from M δ (D) are essentially the same as some of the clauses derived from M(α(D)) with subscript δ; the differences are in the name/arity of predicates (e.g., defeasibly versus defeasibly δ ) and the presence of rules with heads of the form defeasibly δ (free L), supported δ (free L), defeasibly δ (fail L) or supported δ (fail L). However, no atom with subscript δ depends on a predicate with a different subscript, nor on clauses with free or fail in the head. Hence, the consequences of M(D) of the form defeasibly δ (q) and supported δ (q) are unaffected by the presence or absence of such rules, and so we delete them all.
Consequently, the two transformed programs are the same (modulo predicate renaming), and hence have the same conclusions. Since the transformations preserve the semantics of the programs, the result follows.
Corollary 2
Proof
The corollary follows from applying the previous theorem for each tag d to the case where α is the free annotation function, and the correctness of the individual meta-programs.
Theorem 3 (Inclusion Theorem)
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory. (Fitting 1985) .
Recall that Kunen's semantics is the set of all consequences of Φ ↑ n for any finite n. We prove the containments by induction on the iteration of Φ. For brevity, we omit parts of the induction hypothesis related to proving (a). We also omit the parts related to (b), (d) and (f) since, by the Principle of Strong Negation , their statements and proof are symmetric to those for the positive conclusions. The induction hypothesis contains
Clearly this statement holds in the empty interpretation. It is mostly straightforward to show that if the induction hypothesis holds in Φ ↑ n then it holds in Φ ↑ n+1. For example, consider the first two containments in the induction hypothesis. If they hold in Φ ↑ n (and also defeasibly δ * ⊆ defeasibly ∂ * holds) then, applying clause c15, the second containment holds in Φ ↑ n+1 and, applying clause c14, the first containment holds in Φ ↑ n+1. To address fail-expressions we also need the corresponding versions of these containments and arguments for negative conclusions.
One containment, defeasibly ∂ ⊆ supported ∂ is not easily proved by induction, but it has a direct proof. For a set S = Φ ↑ n, if defeasibly ∂ (x) ∈ Φ(S) then there is a supportive rule r whose body literals are defeasibly true in S (i.e. defeasibly ∂ (w i ) ∈ S) and not overruled ∂ (r, x) ∈ S. Now not overruled ∂ (r, x) ∈ S only if, for every rule s for ∼x whose body literals are defeasibly true in S, there is a supportive rule t whose body literals are defeasibly true in S and t > s. Since D is finite and > is acyclic, for some such t, for every such s, s > t. This t can now be used as r in clauses c14 and c15 to show that supported ∂ (x) ∈ Φ(S).
As mentioned in the body of the paper, it is straightforward to compute the consequences of an annotated defeasible theory in quadratic time. We outline the proof.
Proposition 4
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory, and |D| be the number of symbols in D. Then the set of consequences C(D) can be computed in time O(|D| 2 ).
Proof
(Sketch) Consider the grounding of the clauses, by unfolding with the input representation of the defeasible theory and related facts, and the worst-case (i.e. maximum) size of the result. Unfolding with facts like proof tag produces an increase in rules by a constant factor, because the number of tags is fixed. Unfolding clauses for rule etc. produces a set of ground instances linear in the size of rules in D. For clauses c1 and c2, the size of ground instances is proportional to the size of facts/strict rules in D. The size of ground instances of clauses c6, c14, and c15 is proportional to the size of rules in D. The size of ground instances of clauses c10 is proportional to the number of superiority statements in D. The size of ground instances of clauses c3 -c5 and c11 -c13 is proportional to the number of literals in D.
For clauses c7 and c8, the size of the ground instances is proportional to the product of the number of rules in D and the maximum size of rules in D. The size of ground instances of clauses c9 is proportional to the product of the number of superiority statements and the maximum size of rules in D.
Thus the size of all ground clauses is bounded above by |D| 2 . The ground rules form an essentially propositional logic program. Computing the consequences of a propositional logic program under the Kunen semantics is linear in the size of the program. Consequently, the cost of computing the conclusions is O(|D| 2 ).
Recall that S = {partial stable, well -founded , regular , L-stable, Kunen, Fitting} is a set of semantics. These semantics (and the stable semantics) are preserved by unfolding (with the Kunen semantics requiring the restriction on a rule unfolding itself). This was established for the well-founded (Seki 1993; Aravindan and Dung 1995) and stable models (Maher 1990; Aravindan and Dung 1995) , and in (Maher 2017) for the partial stable models and the L-stable models. For the Kunen and Fitting semantics it follows the same proof as in (Maher 1988) for the 2-valued Clark completion semantics. Consequently, Theorem 1 extends to the semantics in S:
Theorem 6
and, if d ∈ {δ * , δ},
Proof
The proof of Theorem 1 also applies to this theorem, since unfolding (without self-unfolding) preserves models for all semantics in S (see Theorem 3.2 of (Maher 2017) ), as does deletion of irrelevant clauses.
